Hagia Filosofia

Imagine waking up one morning and walking to the mirror. I expect to see my face. But what if I see nothing? What would I assume?

I would assume that my mind exists but my body does not. I have an ability to imagine this story as a possibility, that I can exist without a body. I am thinking and yet my body does not exist. This argument leads to the conclusion that the body and soul are two logically separate entities, the crux of Descartes’ Cartesian Dualism.

How can I imagine and talk about my mind without my body if they are the same thing? Can I talk about the computer that I’m typing on without the computer existing? No. If I can tell a story where A exists and B doesn’t exist, then I can conclude that A does not equal to B. A and B must be logically distinct things. Thus, if I can imagine the mind without existing within the body, then the mind and body cannot be identical.

This argument is not trying to conclude that all things that my mind conceives is possible. For example, I can think of the existence of Superman, but that does make it a true possibility. Instead, the argument is specifically claiming that if I can imagine one thing existing without the other, they must be separate things. Both things can still be tied together but the point is I can imagine one without the other. If my mind were merely an extension of my body, then it would be improbable to imagine my body without my mind. Therefore the body and soul two distinct entities.

The veracity of this theory based upon the previous thought experiment is still up to debate but there are compelling methods to argue against it. I can see the Morning Star at dawn in my mind, the last heavenly body seen before light dispels all stars in the sky. I can see the Evening Star at night in my mind, the first heavenly body seen before complete darkness. I can imagine the existence of the Evening Star regardless of the existence of the Morning Star, and vice versa. It’s easy for me to imagine the existence of one without the other. So I can imagine waking up and seeing the Morning Star in the morning, but not see the Evening Star in the evening. Through Descartes logic, the two objects are distinctly different.

Yet, the Morning Star and the Evening Star are in fact, the same thing: the planet Venus. I know that in this universe either the Morning Star and the Evening Star exist, or neither exist. Even if I cannot see the Evening Star, I know that it still exists in the universe. If the Morning Star exists and the Evening Stars didn’t exist, it would be synonymous to Venus existing yet not existing, an impossibility. When I refer to the Evening Star, I am also referring the Morning Star, regardless of whether I am aware or not.

If this scenario framed in the Cartesian argument failed, then it should be plausible to apply the same faults upon Descartes Dualism. While I agree that using such an analogous argument casts doubt upon arguing for the likes of Dualism, I don’t think it can completely disregard the possibility of a soul.